But what is the FDIC?
Oil passages would be designed in instead of drilled in after casting to save both time and material. The resultant savings, Smith said, would finally make GM a small-car power in the U.S. Astonishing EPA-rated fuel economy was promised: 45 mpg city, 60 mpg highway. A major goal for this experiment was finding ways to close the cost gap with “Japan, Inc.,” then estimated at more than $2000 per car. As announced in January 1985, Saturn Corporation would have its own plant, its own employees, its own contract with the United Auto Workers union, and a separate dealer network. Other components need not come from corporate bins, and Saturn was free to devise its own engineering and manufacturing methods.
For some, that long gestation reinforced doubts that GM could field a competitive, profitable, all-American small car — especially given recent efforts like the problem-plagued X-body front-drive compacts. Originally, Saturn vehicles were to be sold by Chevrolet, starting with a front-drive four-door sedan somewhat smaller than a contemporary Chevy Cavalier. The projected price was $5000-$7000 and its introduction was vaguely described as sometime in “the late ’80s.” A two-door coupe and a sport-utility vehicle (SUV) were to follow later. Heady pronouncements along the way didn’t help. By the time Saturn opened for business, however, it was Saturn Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary charged with pioneering new ideas in everything from styling to service.
The engine would be supplied under a recently concluded agreement between GM and the Japanese automaker, who was to get diesel engines from GM affiliate Isuzu in exchange. With that, nearly half of Saturn’s total factory capacity was left idle that year, according to an internal report. In 2000 alone, Saturn lost nearly $840 million, more than $3000 on each sale. Actually, it was do-or-die time. By April 2001, GM was nearly out of patience. The brand created to stop buyers from deserting GM was itself being deserted.
Spring Hill would use robots for welding, applying adhesives and painting the cars, but the plant wasn’t nearly as futuristic as Smith envisioned. The first employees were recruited from other GM operations. The eventual employee roster showed migrants from 46 states with an average of 13 years GM experience. There were just 3800 jobs but more than 16,000 applicants, all evidently intrigued by the Saturn experiment and wanting to be part of it. The real innovation came in labor/management relations. Candidates were invited to Spring Hill for a two-day screening session, and 90 percent of those who came were hired.
The Saturn plant at Spring Hill, Tenn., was still moving slowly on a single shift to assure the highest possible assembly quality, now a must for even entry-level cars. Dealers opened in other areas as production ramped up. By the following spring, Saturn counted 130 “retailers” in 33 states, most of them in 70 major urban markets. The first Saturns were sold by some 30 dealers in Tennessee and neighboring states as well as on the West Coast, long an import stronghold. It was in the retail area that Project Saturn had its greatest impact.
